File Name: rationality and paradigm change in science .zip
For Kuhn, scientific revolutions involved paradigm shifts that punctuated periods of stasis or normal science.
- Kuhn’s two accounts of rational disagreement in science: an interpretation and critique
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- Thomas S. Kuhn (1922—1996)
- Will Economics Finally Get Its Paradigm Shift?
Economics is due for a paradigm shift. It is also, to be fair, something economists have been talking about for decades. Yet it keeps not happening.
Kuhn’s two accounts of rational disagreement in science: an interpretation and critique
Thomas Samuel Kuhn — is one of the most influential philosophers of science of the twentieth century, perhaps the most influential.
His book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions is one of the most cited academic books of all time. His account of the development of science held that science enjoys periods of stable growth punctuated by revisionary revolutions. He then switched to history of science, and as his career developed he moved over to philosophy of science, although retaining a strong interest in the history of physics.
In , he graduated from Harvard summa cum laude. Thereafter he spent the remainder of the war years in research related to radar at Harvard and then in Europe. Kuhn was elected to the prestigious Society of Fellows at Harvard, another of whose members was W.
At this time, and until , Kuhn taught a class in science for undergraduates in the humanities, as part of the General Education in Science curriculum, developed by James B. Conant, the President of Harvard. His initial bewilderment on reading the scientific work of Aristotle was a formative experience, followed as it was by a more or less sudden ability to understand Aristotle properly, undistorted by knowledge of subsequent science.
This led Kuhn to concentrate on history of science and in due course he was appointed to an assistant professorship in general education and the history of science.
During this period his work focussed on eighteenth century matter theory and the early history of thermodynamics. Kuhn then turned to the history of astronomy, and in he published his first book, The Copernican Revolution. In Kuhn became a full professor at the University of California at Berkeley, having moved there in to take up a post in history of science, but in the philosophy department. This enabled him to develop his interest in the philosophy of science.
The functions of a paradigm are to supply puzzles for scientists to solve and to provide the tools for their solution. Crisis is followed by a scientific revolution if the existing paradigm is superseded by a rival. This thesis of incommensurability, developed at the same time by Feyerabend, rules out certain kinds of comparison of the two theories and consequently rejects some traditional views of scientific development, such as the view that later science builds on the knowledge contained within earlier theories, or the view that later theories are closer approximations to the truth than earlier theories.
According to Kuhn himself , , The Structure of Scientific Revolutions first aroused interest among social scientists, although it did in due course create the interest among philosophers that Kuhn had intended and also before long among a much wider academic and general audience. Since the following of rules of logic, of scientific method, etc.
This was highlighted by his rejection of the distinction between discovery and justification denying that we can distinguish between the psychological process of thinking up an idea and the logical process of justifying its claim to truth and his emphasis on incommensurability the claim that certain kinds of comparison between theories are impossible. The negative response among philosophers was exacerbated by an important naturalistic tendency in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions that was then unfamiliar.
In Kuhn left Berkeley to take up the position of M. One of the key events of the Colloquium was intended to be a debate between Kuhn and Feyerabend, with Feyerabend promoting the critical rationalism that he shared with Popper. Papers from these discussants along with contributions from Feyerabend and Lakatos, were published several years later, in Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge , edited by Lakatos and Alan Musgrave the fourth volume of proceedings from this Colloquium.
In the same year the second edition of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions was published, including an important postscript in which Kuhn clarified his notion of paradigm. Kuhn also, for the first time, explicitly gave his work an anti-realist element by denying the coherence of the idea that theories could be regarded as more or less close to the truth.
The following year saw the publication of his second historical monograph Black-Body Theory and the Quantum Discontinuity , concerning the early history of quantum mechanics. In he was named Laurence S. Kuhn continued throughout the s and s to work on a variety of topics in both history and philosophy of science, including the development of the concept of incommensurability, and at the time of his death in he was working on a second philosophical monograph dealing with, among other matters, an evolutionary conception of scientific change and concept acquisition in developmental psychology.
In The Structure of Scientific Revolutions Kuhn paints a picture of the development of science quite unlike any that had gone before. Indeed, before Kuhn, there was little by way of a carefully considered, theoretically explained account of scientific change. Instead, there was a conception of how science ought to develop that was a by-product of the prevailing philosophy of science, as well as a popular, heroic view of scientific progress.
According to such opinions, science develops by the addition of new truths to the stock of old truths, or the increasing approximation of theories to the truth, and in the odd case, the correction of past errors. Such progress might accelerate in the hands of a particularly great scientist, but progress itself is guaranteed by the scientific method. In the s, when Kuhn began his historical studies of science, the history of science was a young academic discipline. Even so, it was becoming clear that scientific change was not always as straightforward as the standard, traditional view would have it.
Kuhn was the first and most important author to articulate a developed alternative account. Since the standard view dovetailed with the dominant, positivist-influenced philosophy of science, a non-standard view would have important consequences for the philosophy of science.
The revolutionary phases are not merely periods of accelerated progress, but differ qualitatively from normal science. Normal science does resemble the standard cumulative picture of scientific progress, on the surface at least.
While this term suggests that normal science is not dramatic, its main purpose is to convey the idea that like someone doing a crossword puzzle or a chess problem or a jigsaw, the puzzle-solver expects to have a reasonable chance of solving the puzzle, that his doing so will depend mainly on his own ability, and that the puzzle itself and its methods of solution will have a high degree of familiarity.
A puzzle-solver is not entering completely uncharted territory. Because its puzzles and their solutions are familiar and relatively straightforward, normal science can expect to accumulate a growing stock of puzzle-solutions. Not all the achievements of the preceding period of normal science are preserved in a revolution, and indeed a later period of science may find itself without an explanation for a phenomenon that in an earlier period was held to be successfully explained.
If, as in the standard picture, scientific revolutions are like normal science but better, then revolutionary science will at all times be regarded as something positive, to be sought, promoted, and welcomed. Kuhn rejected both the traditional and Popperian views in this regard.
He claims that normal science can succeed in making progress only if there is a strong commitment by the relevant scientific community to their shared theoretical beliefs, values, instruments and techniques, and even metaphysics. Because commitment to the disciplinary matrix is a pre-requisite for successful normal science, an inculcation of that commitment is a key element in scientific training and in the formation of the mind-set of a successful scientist.
The unusual emphasis on a conservative attitude distinguishes Kuhn not only from the heroic element of the standard picture but also from Popper and his depiction of the scientist forever attempting to refute her most important theories.
This conservative resistance to the attempted refutation of key theories means that revolutions are not sought except under extreme circumstances. Nor do they regard anomalous results as falsifying those theories. It is only speculative puzzle-solutions that can be falsified in a Popperian fashion during normal science b, Rather, anomalies are ignored or explained away if at all possible. It is only the accumulation of particularly troublesome anomalies that poses a serious problem for the existing disciplinary matrix.
A particularly troublesome anomaly is one that undermines the practice of normal science. For example, an anomaly might reveal inadequacies in some commonly used piece of equipment, perhaps by casting doubt on the underlying theory.
If much of normal science relies upon this piece of equipment, normal science will find it difficult to continue with confidence until this anomaly is addressed. The most interesting response to crisis will be the search for a revised disciplinary matrix, a revision that will allow for the elimination of at least the most pressing anomalies and optimally the solution of many outstanding, unsolved puzzles. Such a revision will be a scientific revolution.
According to Popper the revolutionary overthrow of a theory is one that is logically required by an anomaly. According to Kuhn however, there are no rules for deciding the significance of a puzzle and for weighing puzzles and their solutions against one another.
The decision to opt for a revision of a disciplinary matrix is not one that is rationally compelled; nor is the particular choice of revision rationally compelled. For this reason the revolutionary phase is particularly open to competition among differing ideas and rational disagreement about their relative merits. This suggestion grew in the hands of some sociologists and historians of science into the thesis that the outcome of a scientific revolution, indeed of any step in the development of science, is always determined by socio-political factors.
Kuhn himself repudiated such ideas and his work makes it clear that the factors determining the outcome of a scientific dispute, particularly in modern science, are almost always to be found within science, specifically in connexion with the puzzle-solving power of the competing ideas. The revolutionary search for a replacement paradigm is driven by the failure of the existing paradigm to solve certain important anomalies.
Any replacement paradigm had better solve the majority of those puzzles, or it will not be worth adopting in place of the existing paradigm. It may however lose some qualitative, explanatory power [b, 20]. Hence we can say that revolutions do bring with them an overall increase in puzzle-solving power, the number and significance of the puzzles and anomalies solved by the revised paradigm exceeding the number and significance of the puzzles-solutions that are no longer available as a result of Kuhn-loss.
Indeed he later denies that any sense can be made of the notion of nearness to the truth a, The evolutionary development of an organism might be seen as its response to a challenge set by its environment. But that does not imply that there is some ideal form of the organism that it is evolving towards. Analogously, science improves by allowing its theories to evolve in response to puzzles and progress is measured by its success in solving those puzzles; it is not measured by its progress towards to an ideal true theory.
While evolution does not lead towards ideal organisms, it does lead to greater diversity of kinds of organism. As Wray explains, this is the basis of a Kuhnian account of specialization in science, an account that Kuhn was developing particularly in the latter part of his career.
According to this account, the revolutionary new theory that succeeds in replacing another that is subject to crisis, may fail to satisfy all the needs of those working with the earlier theory. One response to this might be for the field to develop two theories, with domains restricted relative to the original theory one might be the old theory or a version of it.
This formation of new specialties will also bring with it new taxonomic structures and so leads to incommensurability. A mature science, according to Kuhn, experiences alternating phases of normal science and revolutions. In normal science the key theories, instruments, values and metaphysical assumptions that comprise the disciplinary matrix are kept fixed, permitting the cumulative generation of puzzle-solutions, whereas in a scientific revolution the disciplinary matrix undergoes revision, in order to permit the solution of the more serious anomalous puzzles that disturbed the preceding period of normal science.
This is the consensus on exemplary instances of scientific research. The claim that the consensus of a disciplinary matrix is primarily agreement on paradigms-as-exemplars is intended to explain the nature of normal science and the process of crisis, revolution, and renewal of normal science.
It also explains the birth of a mature science. Competing schools of thought possess differing procedures, theories, even metaphysical presuppositions.
Consequently there is little opportunity for collective progress. Even localized progress by a particular school is made difficult, since much intellectual energy is put into arguing over the fundamentals with other schools instead of developing a research tradition.
However, progress is not impossible, and one school may make a breakthrough whereby the shared problems of the competing schools are solved in a particularly impressive fashion. This success draws away adherents from the other schools, and a widespread consensus is formed around the new puzzle-solutions. This widespread consensus now permits agreement on fundamentals. For a problem-solution will embody particular theories, procedures and instrumentation, scientific language, metaphysics, and so forth.
Consensus on the puzzle-solution will thus bring consensus on these other aspects of a disciplinary matrix also. The successful puzzle-solution, now a paradigm puzzle-solution, will not solve all problems. Indeed, it will probably raise new puzzles. For example, the theories it employs may involve a constant whose value is not known with precision; the paradigm puzzle-solution may employ approximations that could be improved; it may suggest other puzzles of the same kind; it may suggest new areas for investigation.
Generating new puzzles is one thing that the paradigm puzzle-solution does; helping solve them is another. In the most favourable scenario, the new puzzles raised by the paradigm puzzle-solution can be addressed and answered using precisely the techniques that the paradigm puzzle-solution employs.
And since the paradigm puzzle-solution is accepted as a great achievement, these very similar puzzle-solutions will be accepted as successful solutions also. For the novel puzzle-solution which crystallizes consensus is regarded and used as a model of exemplary science.
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Second, I will assess both accounts. This is a preview of subscription content, access via your institution. Rent this article via DeepDyve. See e. Here is just a small collection of examples: Bird , George , p. See Carrier , p.
A paradigm shift , a concept identified by the American physicist and philosopher Thomas Kuhn , is a fundamental change in the basic concepts and experimental practices of a scientific discipline. Even though Kuhn restricted the use of the term to the natural sciences, the concept of a paradigm shift has also been used in numerous non-scientific contexts to describe a profound change in a fundamental model or perception of events. Kuhn presented his notion of a paradigm shift in his influential book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions Kuhn contrasts paradigm shifts, which characterize a scientific revolution , to the activity of normal science , which he describes as scientific work done within a prevailing framework or paradigm. Paradigm shifts arise when the dominant paradigm under which normal science operates is rendered incompatible with new phenomena, facilitating the adoption of a new theory or paradigm.
Thomas S. Kuhn (1922—1996)
Kuhn begins by formulating some assumptions that lay the foundation for subsequent discussion and by briefly outlining the key contentions of the book. A scientific community cannot practice its trade without some set of received beliefs p. These beliefs form the foundation of the "educational initiation that prepares and licenses the student for professional practice" 5.
Intereconomics on Twitter. This paper seeks to understand the processes of paradigm shifts in economic ideas and policy. The final section assesses the degree to which economic and political conditions since the financial crisis offer an opportunity for a new paradigm shift away from neoliberalism. Modern economic history can be roughly split into different eras in which certain sets of ideas have dominated politics and policy. We shall refer to a dominant group of ideas as a politico-economic paradigm.
Thomas Samuel Kuhn — is one of the most influential philosophers of science of the twentieth century, perhaps the most influential. His book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions is one of the most cited academic books of all time. His account of the development of science held that science enjoys periods of stable growth punctuated by revisionary revolutions. He then switched to history of science, and as his career developed he moved over to philosophy of science, although retaining a strong interest in the history of physics.
Will Economics Finally Get Its Paradigm Shift?
I note in particular the common aspects of their proposal that typically, radical change is not, indeed, cannot be justified by reasons. Their responses to and arguments for this threat to rationality are critically examined. Her work thus provides a promising alternative to the above positions and the impasse they confront. People sometimes change their deepest convictions or, more extremely, their way of life. How do these dramatic changes occur? In contrast to everyday, routine changes of mind that can be explained by reasons , off-scale changes of mind tend to resist rational explanation and therefore confront us with the limits of rationality.
- У тебя было много времени. Сьюзан положила руку на мышку и вывела окно состояния Следопыта. Сколько времени он уже занят поиском. Открылось окно - такие же цифровые часы, как на ТРАНСТЕКСТЕ, которые должны были показывать часы и минуты работы Следопыта. Однако вместо этого Сьюзан увидела нечто совершенно иное, от чего кровь застыла в жилах.
Следопыт так и не вернулся. Хейл его отключил. И Сьюзан принялась объяснять, как Хейл отозвал Следопыта и как она обнаружила электронную почту Танкадо, отправленную на адрес Хейла.
Сьюзан оставила это замечание без ответа. - У правительств должно быть право собирать информацию, в которой может содержаться угроза общественной безопасности. - Господи Иисусе! - шумно вздохнул Хейл. - Похоже, Стратмор здорово промыл тебе мозги. Ты отлично знаешь, что ФБР не может прослушивать телефонные разговоры произвольно: для этого они должны получить ордер.
Она попробовала закричать, но голос ей не повиновался. Ей хотелось убежать, но сильные руки тянули ее. - Я люблю тебя, - шептал коммандер.
Боль внизу нестерпима, - прошипел он ей на ухо. Колени у Сьюзан подкосились, и она увидела над головой кружащиеся звезды. ГЛАВА 80 Хейл, крепко сжимая шею Сьюзан, крикнул в темноту: - Коммандер, твоя подружка у меня в руках. Я требую выпустить меня отсюда. В ответ - тишина.
Сэр! - Беккер поднял обе руки, точно признавая свое поражение. - Меня не интересует ваша колонка. Я из канадского консульства.
Вопреки отчаянным попыткам подавить охвативший ее страх Сьюзан явственно ощущала, что это чувство завладевает ею безраздельно. Она металась между дверцами кабинок и рукомойниками. Потеряв ориентацию, двигалась, вытянув перед собой руки и пытаясь восстановить в памяти очертания комнаты.