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The problem of induction is the philosophical question of what are the justifications , if any, for any growth of knowledge understood in the classic philosophical sense —knowledge that goes beyond a mere collection of observations  —highlighting the apparent lack of justification in particular for:. The traditional inductivist view is that all claimed empirical laws, either in everyday life or through the scientific method , can be justified through some form of reasoning. The problem is that many philosophers tried to find such a justification but their proposals were not accepted by others.
The problem of induction is the philosophical question of what are the justifications , if any, for any growth of knowledge understood in the classic philosophical sense —knowledge that goes beyond a mere collection of observations  —highlighting the apparent lack of justification in particular for:. The traditional inductivist view is that all claimed empirical laws, either in everyday life or through the scientific method , can be justified through some form of reasoning.
The problem is that many philosophers tried to find such a justification but their proposals were not accepted by others. Identifying the inductivist view as the scientific view, C. Broad once said that "induction is the glory of science and the scandal of philosophy". In contrast, Karl Popper 's critical rationalism claimed that inductive justifications are never used in science and proposed instead that science is based on the procedure of conjecturing hypotheses , deductively calculating consequences, and then empirically attempting to falsify them.
In inductive reasoning , one makes a series of observations and infers a new claim based on them. That next Monday the woman walks by the market merely adds to the series of observations, it does not prove she will walk by the market every Monday.
In fact, David Hume would even argue that we cannot claim it is "more probable", since this still requires the assumption that the past predicts the future. Second, the observations themselves do not establish the validity of inductive reasoning, except inductively. Bertrand Russell illustrated this point in The Problems of Philosophy :. Domestic animals expect food when they see the person who usually feeds them.
We know that all these rather crude expectations of uniformity are liable to be misleading. The man who has fed the chicken every day throughout its life at last wrings its neck instead, showing that more refined views as to the uniformity of nature would have been useful to the chicken.
The works of the Pyrrhonist philosopher Sextus Empiricus contain the oldest surviving questioning of the validity of inductive reasoning. He wrote: . It is also easy, I consider, to set aside the method of induction. For, when they propose to establish the universal from the particulars by means of induction, they will effect this by a review either of all or of some of the particular instances. But if they review some, the induction will be insecure, since some of the particulars omitted in the induction may contravene the universal; while if they are to review all, they will be toiling at the impossible, since the particulars are infinite and indefinite.
Thus on both grounds, as I think, the consequence is that induction is invalidated. The focus upon the gap between the premises and conclusion present in the above passage appears different from Hume's focus upon the circular reasoning of induction. However, Weintraub claims in The Philosophical Quarterly  that although Sextus's approach to the problem appears different, Hume's approach was actually an application of another argument raised by Sextus: .
Those who claim for themselves to judge the truth are bound to possess a criterion of truth. This criterion, then, either is without a judge's approval or has been approved.
But if it is without approval, whence comes it that it is truthworthy? For no matter of dispute is to be trusted without judging. And, if it has been approved, that which approves it, in turn, either has been approved or has not been approved, and so on ad infinitum. Although the criterion argument applies to both deduction and induction, Weintraub believes that Sextus's argument "is precisely the strategy Hume invokes against induction: it cannot be justified, because the purported justification, being inductive, is circular.
They held that since inference needed an invariable connection between the middle term and the predicate, and further, that since there was no way to establish this invariable connection, that the efficacy of inference as a means of valid knowledge could never be stated.
The 9th century Indian skeptic, Jayarasi Bhatta , also made an attack on inference, along with all means of knowledge, and showed by a type of reductio argument that there was no way to conclude universal relations from the observation of particular instances. Medieval writers such as al-Ghazali and William of Ockham connected the problem with God's absolute power, asking how we can be certain that the world will continue behaving as expected when God could at any moment miraculously cause the opposite.
David Hume, a Scottish thinker of the Enlightenment era, is the philosopher most often associated with induction. Here, Hume introduces his famous distinction between "relations of ideas" and "matters of fact. Matters of fact, meanwhile, are not verified through the workings of deductive logic but by experience. Specifically, matters of fact are established by making an inference about causes and effects from repeatedly observed experience.
While relations of ideas are supported by reason alone, matters of fact must rely on the connection of a cause and effect through experience. Causes of effects cannot be linked through a priori reasoning, but by positing a "necessary connection" that depends on the "uniformity of nature. He writes that reasoning alone cannot establish the grounds of causation. Instead, the human mind imputes causation to phenomena after repeatedly observing a connection between two objects. For Hume, establishing the link between causes and effects relies not on reasoning alone, but the observation of " constant conjunction " throughout one's sensory experience.
From this discussion, Hume goes onto present his formulation of the problem of induction in A Treatise of Human Nature , writing "there can be no demonstrative arguments to prove, that those instances, of which we have had no experience, resemble those, of which we have had experience. In other words, the problem of induction can be framed in the following way: we cannot apply a conclusion about a particular set of observations to a more general set of observations.
While deductive logic allows one to arrive at a conclusion with certainty, inductive logic can only provide a conclusion that is probably true. This is a common misperception about the difference between inductive and deductive thinking. According to the literal standards of logic, deductive reasoning arrives at certain conclusions while inductive reasoning arrives at probable conclusions.
Therefore, Hume establishes induction as the very grounds for attributing causation. There might be many effects which stem from a single cause. Over repeated observation, one establishes that a certain set of effects are linked to a certain set of causes. However, the future resemblance of these connections to connections observed in the past depends on induction.
Induction allows one to conclude that "Effect A2" was caused by "Cause A2" because a connection between "Effect A1" and "Cause A1" was observed repeatedly in the past.
Given that reason alone can not be sufficient to establish the grounds of induction, Hume implies that induction must be accomplished through imagination. One does not make an inductive reference through a priori reasoning, but through an imaginative step automatically taken by the mind.
Hume does not challenge that induction is performed by the human mind automatically, but rather hopes to show more clearly how much human inference depends on inductive—not a priori—reasoning. He does not deny future uses of induction, but shows that it is distinct from deductive reasoning, helps to ground causation, and wants to inquire more deeply into its validity.
Hume offers no solution to the problem of induction himself. He prompts other thinkers and logicians to argue for the validity of induction as an ongoing dilemma for philosophy. A key issue with establishing the validity of induction is that one is tempted to use an inductive inference as a form of justification itself. This is because people commonly justify the validity of induction by pointing to the many instances in the past when induction proved to be accurate.
For example, one might argue that it is valid to use inductive inference in the future because this type of reasoning has yielded accurate results in the past. However, this argument relies on an inductive premise itself—that past observations of induction being valid will mean that future observations of induction will also be valid. Thus, many solutions to the problem of induction tend to be circular.
Nelson Goodman 's Fact, Fiction, and Forecast presented a different description of the problem of induction in the chapter entitled "The New Riddle of Induction". Goodman proposed the new predicate " grue ". Something is grue if and only if it has been or will be, according to a scientific, general hypothesis   observed to be green before a certain time t , or blue if observed after that time. The "new" problem of induction is, since all emeralds we have ever seen are both green and grue, why do we suppose that after time t we will find green but not grue emeralds?
The problem here raised is that two different inductions will be true and false under the same conditions. In other words:. Goodman, however, points out that the predicate "grue" only appears more complex than the predicate "green" because we have defined grue in terms of blue and green.
If we had always been brought up to think in terms of "grue" and "bleen" where bleen is blue before time t , or green thereafter , we would intuitively consider "green" to be a crazy and complicated predicate. Goodman believed that which scientific hypotheses we favour depend on which predicates are "entrenched" in our language.
Quine offers a practical solution to this problem  by making the metaphysical claim that only predicates that identify a " natural kind " i. Bhaskar also offers a practical solution to the problem. He argues that the problem of induction only arises if we deny the possibility of a reason for the predicate, located in the enduring nature of something. If we were to change that structure, they would not be green.
For instance, emeralds are a kind of green beryl , made green by trace amounts of chromium and sometimes vanadium. Without these trace elements, the gems would be colourless. Although induction is not made by reason, Hume observes that we nonetheless perform it and improve from it.
It is by custom or habit that one draws the inductive connection described above, and "without the influence of custom we would be entirely ignorant of every matter of fact beyond what is immediately present to the memory and senses". David Stove 's argument for induction, based on the statistical syllogism , was presented in the Rationality of Induction and was developed from an argument put forward by one of Stove's heroes, the late Donald Cary Williams formerly Professor at Harvard in his book The Ground of Induction.
For example, the majority of the subsets which contain ravens which you can form from the raven population are similar to the population itself and this applies no matter how large the raven population is, as long as it is not infinite. Consequently, Stove argued that if you find yourself with such a subset then the chances are that this subset is one of the ones that are similar to the population, and so you are justified in concluding that it is likely that this subset "matches" the population reasonably closely.
Similarly, when getting a sample of ravens the probability is very high that the sample is one of the matching or "representative" ones. So as long as you have no reason to think that your sample is an unrepresentative one, you are justified in thinking that probably although not certainly that it is. An intuitive answer to Hume would be to say that a world inaccessible to any inductive procedure would simply not be conceivable.
This intuition was taken into account by Keith Campbell by considering that, to be built, a concept must be reapplied, which demands a certain continuity in its object of application and consequently some openness to induction.
Moreover, the nearer a future is to the point of junction with its past, the greater are the similarities tendentially involved. Consequently, — contra Hume — some form of principle of homogeneity causal or structural between future and past must be warranted, which would make some inductive procedure always possible.
Karl Popper , a philosopher of science , sought to solve the problem of induction. According to Popper, the problem of induction as usually conceived is asking the wrong question: it is asking how to justify theories given they cannot be justified by induction. Popper argued that justification is not needed at all, and seeking justification "begs for an authoritarian answer".
Instead, Popper said, what should be done is to look to find and correct errors. Science should seek for theories that are most probably false on the one hand which is the same as saying that they are highly falsifiable and so there are many ways that they could turn out to be wrong , but still all actual attempts to falsify them have failed so far that they are highly corroborated. Wesley C. Salmon criticizes Popper on the grounds that predictions need to be made both for practical purposes and in order to test theories.
That means Popperians need to make a selection from the number of unfalsified theories available to them, which is generally more than one. Popperians would wish to choose well-corroborated theories, in their sense of corroboration, but face a dilemma: either they are making the essentially inductive claim that a theory's having survived criticism in the past means it will be a reliable predictor in the future; or Popperian corroboration is no indicator of predictive power at all, so there is no rational motivation for their preferred selection principle.
David Miller has criticized this kind of criticism by Salmon and others because it makes inductivist assumptions. The predictive power [ according to whom? The rational motivation for choosing a well-corroborated theory is that it is simply easier to falsify: Well-corroborated means that at least one kind of experiment already conducted at least once could have falsified but did not actually falsify the one theory, while the same kind of experiment, regardless of its outcome, could not have falsified the other.
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Pseudoscience consists of statements, beliefs , or practices that claim to be both scientific and factual but are incompatible with the scientific method. The demarcation between science and pseudoscience has philosophical , political , and scientific implications. Pseudoscience can have dangerous effects. For example, pseudoscientific anti-vaccine activism and promotion of homeopathic remedies as alternative disease treatments can result in people forgoing important medical treatments with demonstrable health benefits, leading to deaths and ill-health. Pseudoscientific theories about racial and ethnic classifications has led to racism and genocide. The term pseudoscience is often considered pejorative particularly by purveyors of it, because it suggests something is being presented as science inaccurately or even deceptively.
Science is an enormously successful human enterprise. The study of scientific method is the attempt to discern the activities by which that success is achieved. Among the activities often identified as characteristic of science are systematic observation and experimentation, inductive and deductive reasoning, and the formation and testing of hypotheses and theories. How these are carried out in detail can vary greatly, but characteristics like these have been looked to as a way of demarcating scientific activity from non-science, where only enterprises which employ some canonical form of scientific method or methods should be considered science see also the entry on science and pseudo-science. On the other hand, more recent debate has questioned whether there is anything like a fixed toolkit of methods which is common across science and only science. Scientific method should be distinguished from the aims and products of science, such as knowledge, predictions, or control. Methods are the means by which those goals are achieved.
Many factors have frozen the public policy debate on climate change, but none more important than the disinterest of both sides in tests that might provide better evidence — and perhaps restart the discussion. Even worse, too little thought has been given to the criteria for validating climate science theories aka their paradigm and the models build upon them. This series looks at the answers to these questions given us by generations of philosophers and scientists, which we have ignored. The clock is running for actions that might break the deadlock.
This volume is a result of that effort. The concept of falsification, the problem of demarcation, the ban on induction, or the role of the empirical basis, along with the provocative parallels between historicism, holism and totalitarianism, have always caused controversies. The aim of this volume is not to smooth them but show them as a challenge.
Unended Quest: An Intellectual Autobiography
It is a theory of how to create scientific knowledge. Presently, there is widespread agreement on how to do science, namely conjectures, ideally in the form of a mathematical model, and refutations, testing the model using empirical evidence. Expanding philosophy of science so that it more successfully encompasses social systems would create new avenues of inquiry. Two dimensions could be added to philosophy of science: the amount of attention paid to the observer and the amount of impact of a theory on the system described. I claim that there are at least three epistemologies and that they can be combined to form a more robust conception of knowledge and of how to do research. There are at least four models and four basic elements i.
Listeners interpret prophetic teachings, consciously or unconsciously, in terms of their metaphysical assumptions. For western Gentile converts to Christianity, this meant in terms of Platonic and Aristotelean philosophies. The advent of the empiricism with the Enlightenment led to less emphasis placed on intuitive thought and more on sensory experience, not unlike the older Hebrew approach. While empiricism was not wholly consistent in its rejection of inferred entities, it became the dominant methodology of science. Mental experience, being beyond the reach of sensory observation, was rejected in favour of observable behaviour and was assumed to be completely explained by bodily processes.
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Karl R. Popper Manufactured in the United States of America 1 Science: Conjectures and Refutations their own creators, as happened with Newton.
Evolutionary Epistemology EE is a naturalistic approach to epistemology and so is part of philosophy of science. Other naturalistic approaches include sociological, historical and anthropological explanations of knowledge. What makes EE specific is that it subscribes to the idea that cognition is to be understood primarily as a product of biological evolution. What does this mean exactly?
Шифр до сих пор не взломан. Сьюзан от изумления застыла с открытым ртом. Она посмотрела на часы, потом на Стратмора. - Все еще не взломан.
Обескураженная, Сьюзан подалась. Она смотрела на коммандера и второй раз за этот день не могла его узнать. Вдруг она ощутила страшное одиночество.
Беккер убрал блокнот и ручку. Игра в шарады закончилась.
Если Стратмор обошел фильтры вручную, данный факт будет отражен в распечатке. - Какое отношение это имеет к директорскому кабинету. Мидж повернулась на вращающемся стуле. - Такой список выдает только принтер Фонтейна. Ты это отлично знаешь.
Однако тот не подавал никаких признаков жизни. Сьюзан перевела взгляд на помост перед кабинетом Стратмора и ведущую к нему лестницу. - Коммандер. Молчание.
Стратмор отрешенно кивнул: - Он вернется сегодня вечером. Сьюзан представила себе, что пришлось пережить коммандеру, - весь этот груз бесконечного ожидания, бесконечные часы, бесконечные встречи. Говорили, что от него уходит жена, с которой он прожил лет тридцать.
Проинструктировать. Относительно .